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The truncated core for games with limited aspirations

Anne van den Nouweland (), Luisa Carpente (), Balbina Casas-Méndez () and Ignacio García-Jurado ()
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Anne van den Nouweland: University of Oregon
Luisa Carpente: University of La Coruña
Balbina Casas-Méndez: University of Santiago de Compostela
Ignacio García-Jurado: University of Santiago de Compostela

University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department

Abstract: We define and study games with limited aspirations. In a game with limited aspirations there are upper bounds on the possible payoffs for some coalitions. These restrictions require adjustments in the definitions of solution concepts. In the current paper we study the effect of the restrictions on the core and define and study the so-called truncated core.

JEL-codes: C71 C6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2007-10-01
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