The truncated core for games with limited aspirations
Anne van den Nouweland (),
Luisa Carpente (),
Balbina Casas-MÃ©ndez () and
Ignacio GarcÃa-Jurado ()
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Anne van den Nouweland: University of Oregon
Luisa Carpente: University of La CoruÃ±a
Balbina Casas-MÃ©ndez: University of Santiago de Compostela
Ignacio GarcÃa-Jurado: University of Santiago de Compostela
University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department
We define and study games with limited aspirations. In a game with limited aspirations there are upper bounds on the possible payoffs for some coalitions. These restrictions require adjustments in the definitions of solution concepts. In the current paper we study the effect of the restrictions on the core and define and study the so-called truncated core.
JEL-codes: C71 C6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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