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Segregation of Duties, Investigative Independence, and Legal Privilege: Institutional Legitimacy and Structural Safeguards in Corporate Investigations

Luiz Carlos Nacif Lagrotta

No 4fx6g_v1, LawArchive from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Corporate investigations have become a defining feature of modern governance systems, operating at the intersection of organizational accountability, regulatory exposure, evidentiary reconstruction, and institutional trust. Their expansion beyond internal disciplinary functions has transformed investigations into exercises of institutional power whose legitimacy depends fundamentally on structural safeguards. This article examines segregation of duties, investigative independence, proportionality constraints, evidentiary integrity, and legal privilege as components of a unified architecture of procedural legitimacy. Rather than treating these safeguards as technical compliance mechanisms or jurisdiction-specific requirements, the study situates them within a broader theory of institutional integrity and epistemic reliability. Drawing upon comparative jurisprudence, international governance standards, and interdisciplinary scholarship, the article argues that investigative legitimacy is sustained not by the efficiency of outcomes but by the credibility of institutional design. It concludes that the durability and defensibility of investigative systems depend on structural impartiality, methodological rigor, and the preservation of the legal architecture of trust.

Date: 2026-10-29
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:lawarc:4fx6g_v1

DOI: 10.31228/osf.io/4fx6g_v1

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