Getting it right the first time: Financial penalties to improve disability benefit assessments

Evan Odell

No jksyp_v1, LawArchive from Center for Open Science

Abstract: This paper explores the problem of low accuracy in disability benefit assessments, using the UK as an example. The UK's disability benefits system has been subject to substantial reforms in the previous decade, and continues to be in flux. I suggest the introduction of financial incentives to shift the assessment process towards treating claimants' statements at face value (and running the risk of false positives), away from the current practice of treating all claimants with scepticism (and running the risk of false negatives).

Date: 2020-05-29
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:lawarc:jksyp_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/jksyp_v1

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