Felix Gonzales-Torres on Contracts

Joan Kee

No ktxdz_v1, LawArchive from Center for Open Science

Abstract: 26 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy (2017) Contracts involving the sale or transfer of artworks generally aspire to rationalism. Parties sign them in order to maximize gain and minimize risk. In the art world, the contract is closely associated with a zero-sum mentality that emphasizes the relationship between artists, gallerists, institutions, and other owners as one marked by compromise, if not outright antagonism. In many cases, the very use of contracts implies that no one will get everything he, she, or it wants. When the artist is famous, the contract is a matter of take-it-or-leave-it, and negotiation is not possible. In such a case, the owner is more likely to treat the prospective purchase as a unique good for which no acceptable substitution exists.

Date: 2018-01-16
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://osf.io/download/5a5e5fb1ff20fa000cec980a/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:lawarc:ktxdz_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/ktxdz_v1

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LawArchive from Center for Open Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by OSF ().