The Compensation Myth and U.C.C. Section 2-713

Cornell Library and David Frisch

No 6qsvn, LawRxiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: This article seeks to bring greater discipline to the analysis of market damages by probing two basic assumptions that are routinely made in discussions of section 2-713: (1) that overcompensation concerns justify judicial interference with the buyer's choice of remedy; and (2) that the relevant market price, in all cases, is the market price that the aggrieved buyer would be required to pay if she wished to make a substitute purchase of goods elsewhere.

Date: 2017-05-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:lawarx:6qsvn

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/6qsvn

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