Deconstructing Duty Free: Investor-State Arbitration as Private Anti-Bribery Enforcement

Cornell Library and Andrew B. Spalding

No sxqtp, LawRxiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Duty Free rests upon a kind of three-legged stool of legal argumentation. Those legs are: 1) the common law of contract; 2) principles of state liability for official misconduct; and 3) global anti-corruption policy. As this article will show, each leg of that stool is fundamentally flawed; the legal arguments are unpersuasive and occasionally incorrect. This article seeks to deconstruct that stool, exposing the fatal structural flaws in each leg. It thus clears the way for building an arbitral jurisprudence of corruption that actually does what Duty Free attempted: advance global anti-corruption policy in a way that will inure to the true victims of corruption, who are the citizens of the world's developing countries.

Date: 2017-05-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://osf.io/download/591365d79ad5a102515de070/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:lawarx:sxqtp

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/sxqtp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LawRxiv from Center for Open Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by OSF ().