The European Cartel Office (ECO) revisited

Florian Idelberger

No x4bg8, LawRxiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: The stability and long-term survival of EU institutions should not be taken for granted, not even for a successful institution such as DG Competition. This point was underlined by the on-going crisis. Thus, it makes sense to evaluate alternative concepts of governance and policy. To this end, this paper analyses in how far the concept and prospects of an ECO are still viable today. Through critical examination of relevant literature, the past developments in this regard are analysed. Furthermore, a model of aspects that are important for competition law enforcement is used to draw a comprehensive picture of aspects important for competition law enforcement and its institutions, such as goals, independence, competition economics, procedural issues, caseload and structure. Finally a normative evaluation of a prospective independent agency is done, which shows a possible solution for an independent European Cartel Office. This institution would be quite similar to DG Competition in some aspects, but potentially quite different, especially with regard to procedure.

Date: 2012-06-29
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:lawarx:x4bg8

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/x4bg8

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