Cities, Conflict, and Corridors

Shuhei Kitamura and Nils-Petter Lagerlof ()

No cfrzs, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: In this paper we propose that state structure in European history is linked to how geography affects the effective distance between state capitals. First we document that military battles tend to occur close to the shortest-distance corridors between the capitals of the belligerent powers, *except* where that corridor is intercepted by certain types of geography, specifically seas, mountains, and marshes. Geography thus seems to have influenced the effective military distance between the belligerents’ capitals. Then we explore similar corridors between a multitude of European cities, documenting two patterns: (1) state capitals tend to be closer to each other when the geography between them is more separating, as measured by similar types of geography found to affect battle locations; (2) controlling for distance, the likelihood that any two cities are located in the same state decreases with the same types of geography between them. We present a model consistent with these patterns.

Date: 2021-11-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-his and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:cfrzs

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/cfrzs

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