Addictive Auctions: using lucky-draw and gambling addiction to increase participation during auctioning

Ravin Kumar

No darvs, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Auction theories are believed to provide a better selling opportunity for the resources to be allocated. Various organizations have taken measures to increase trust among participants towards their auction system, but trust alone cannot ensure a high level of participation. We propose a new type of auction system which takes advantage of lucky-draw and gambling addictions to increase the engagement level of candidates in an auction. Our system makes use of security features present in existing auction systems for ensuring fairness and maintaining trust among participants.

Date: 2019-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:darvs

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/darvs

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