Analysis of Sydney railway workers' strike based on static and dynamic game of complete information

Shunxin Yao

No tmcfq_v1, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: This paper uses the Sydney railway workers’ strike from 2024 to 2025 as a backdrop, employing game theory models to analyze the strategic interactions between unions and the government in labor negotiations. By constructing both static and dynamic game models, the study reveals the decisive impact of game structure on equilibrium outcomes. Under the static game framework, the lack of coordination mechanisms may lead both sides into suboptimal strategy combinations. In contrast, in dynamic games, the union can take the initiative and issue credible strike threats, guiding the government to make concessions, thus forming a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). This equilibrium is not only stable but also likely to be Pareto optimal compared to potential escalation scenarios. The research indicates that in modern labor relations, the order of actions, the credibility of threats, and institutional response mechanisms have critical impacts on negotiation outcomes.

Date: 2025-05-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:tmcfq_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/tmcfq_v1

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