Is the Antitrust Policy Trustful? (I) - Strategy Machanism of Lockefeller’s Monoploy
James L. Luo
No utrx6, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science
This paper develops a non-equilibrium concept to deal with the competition process in the free market and designs time-featured models to analyze the cases of Rockefeller’s monopolization rather than the oligarch models based on Nash equilibrium. It derives some results that are quite different from popular perception of monopoly and reject all accusations of antitrust laws. The conclusion applies to a wide class of markets and extends its application to the field of lawmaking.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:utrx6
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by OSF ().