Contrasting Incentives for Earnings Management: Board Activity and Board Remuneration in Spanish Firms
Laura Muro and
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Ryan McWay: University of Michigan
No xgn3y, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science
We analyze the effect board activity and board remuneration has on earnings management (EM). Our results show that more active boards are inefficient in preventing earnings manipulation. Regarding board compensation we find a U-shaped relation indicating that excessive remuneration will lead to more earnings management. Policy recommendations are derived from the findings.
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