What drives public trust in elections? Experimental evidence from Malawi

Johan Ahlback and Alexander Yeandle

No xhuz5_v1, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: International donors have invested heavily in strengthening electoral administration in low-income democracies, aiming to reduce irregularities and build trust. However, we know little about whether these interventions actually improve public perceptions. Using a conjoint choice experiment in Malawi, randomising organisational features of polling stations and their potential for political bias, we examine the determinants of public trust in a low-income setting. Voters are more trusting of stations with well-trained polling staff, independent monitors, security personnel, and transparency measures, effects driven by sanctioning the absence of these basic requirements. Respondents also prioritise procedurally fair measures over those that exclusively benefit their own party or ethnic group, challenging assumptions about the dominance of partisanship and ethnicity in African elections. We contribute to the literature on election administration and public opinion in low-income settings, while highlighting ways in which resource-constrained election bodies can build and maintain public support.

Date: 2025-08-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-dcm and nep-exp
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://osf.io/download/68a42e6a198e4baf0e8a8a96/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:xhuz5_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/xhuz5_v1

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by OSF ().