Cooperation is unaffected by the threat of severe adverse events in Public Goods Games

Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli, Chiara Nardi and Veronica Pizziol

No yrt63, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: We study how cooperation in one-shot Public Goods Games with large group sizes is affected by the presence of a slight chance of severe adverse events. We find that cooperation is substantial, notwithstanding a low marginal return of contributions. The cooperation level is comparable to what is found in similar settings for small-sized groups. Furthermore, we find no appreciable effect of the threat of severe adverse events, whether their realization is independent across individuals, perfectly positively or negatively correlated. We conclude that cooperation in the Public Goods Game is unlikely to be affected by rare adverse events, independently of how risk is correlated across individuals.

Date: 2023-07-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Cooperation is unaffected by the threat of severe adverse events in public goods games (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:yrt63

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/yrt63

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