Elites as Democratic Gatekeepers: Theory and Evidence from Norway

Daniel A. N. Goldstein, Kaja Sparre Bakke, Sirianne Dahlum and Tore Wig
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Daniel A. N. Goldstein: University of Oslo

No 2rwgt_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Studies of democratic backsliding suggest that political elites can, but often fail to, serve as "democratic gatekeepers" by punishing autocratic colleagues to protect democracy. While there is a substantial body of literature examining voters' preferences for democracy and their reactions to democratic violations by elites, we know less about elites' preferences for democratic gatekeeping in contemporary democracies. We develop a theory of democratic gatekeeping among political elites in democracies, examining the practice within and between parties. We tested the implications of this theory in pre-registered survey experiments targeting approximately 8,000 national and local elected representatives and party officials in Norway. We then compared the results to those of a survey of citizens. Through various experimental approaches, we uncover the gatekeeping preferences of Norwegian political elites when exposed to anti-democratic party colleagues and political parties as potential coalition partners.

Date: 2026-05-23
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:2rwgt_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/2rwgt_v1

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