The Fake Friend Dilemma: Trust and the Political Economy of Conversational AI

Jacob Erickson
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Jacob Erickson: Vassar College

No 4ahj9_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: As conversational AI systems become increasingly integrated into everyday life, they raise pressing concerns about user autonomy, trust, and the commercial interests that influence their behavior. To address these concerns, this paper develops the Fake Friend Dilemma (FFD), a sociotechnical condition in which users place trust in AI agents that appear supportive while pursuing goals that are misaligned with the user’s own. The FFD provides a critical framework for examining how anthropomorphic AI systems facilitate subtle forms of manipulation and exploitation. Drawing on literature in trust, AI alignment, and surveillance capitalism, we construct a typology of harms, including covert advertising, political propaganda, behavioral nudging, and surveillance. We then assess possible mitigation strategies, including both structural and technical interventions. By focusing on trust as a vector of asymmetrical power, the FFD offers a lens for understanding how AI systems may undermine user autonomy while maintaining the appearance of helpfulness.

Date: 2026-01-08
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:4ahj9_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/4ahj9_v1

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