Hierarchical Control

Greg Sasso, Ian R Turner and Christopher Li
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Greg Sasso: Bocconi University
Ian R Turner: Yale University

No 5gt8y_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Theories of political accountability typically focus on voter-politician relationships. However, overall government performance depends on both elected politicians and unelected bureaucrats. Politicians are agents of voters while serving as principals to bureaucrats. We develop a model of electoral accountability in governance hierarchies, treating it as a chain of relational contracts. The problem of optimizing electoral control reduces to a classic static consumer problem, and we illustrate how voter welfare and governance quality respond to changes in the political-economic environment.

Date: 2020-03-30
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:5gt8y_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/5gt8y_v1

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