Pay Me Later: Savings Constraints and the Demand for Deferred Payments

Lasse Brune, Eric Chyn and Jason Kerwin

No 8xn9m, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: We study a simple savings scheme that allows workers to defer receipt of part of their wages for three months at zero interest. The scheme significantly increases savings during the deferral period, leading to higher post-disbursement spending on lumpy goods. Two years later, after two additional rounds of the savings scheme, we find that treated workers have made permanent improvements to their homes. The popularity of the scheme implies a lack of good alternative savings options. The results of a follow-up experiment suggest that demand for the scheme is partly due to its ability to address self-control issues.

Date: 2021-03-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Journal Article: Pay Me Later: Savings Constraints and the Demand for Deferred Payments (2021)
Working Paper: Pay Me Later: Savings Constraints and the Demand for Deferred Payments (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:8xn9m

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/8xn9m

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