The Weight of Precedent: Parties, Institutions, and Executive Norms

Daniel A. N. Goldstein and Collin Thomas Schumock
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Daniel A. N. Goldstein: University of Oslo

No 9dv4u_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Political executives often adhere to informal traditions established by their predecessors. Yet, without legal backing, elites have incentives to violate norms for political gain. Under what conditions do constraining executive norms persist and when are they abandoned? We address this question by using an infinite horizon formal model to analyze the maintenance of executive norms. We identify intra-party accountability and variation in patience among actors within the same party as significant for norm maintenance. We also detail how expectations about the expected behavior of out-of-power parties shape the willingness to violate norms while in office. The insights from the model enable us to classify a number of executive norms according to their fragility and to examine the trajectory of one norm in-depth: the two-term tradition of the American presidency. Our findings shed light on how informal institutions regulate executive behavior and advance our understanding of institutional stability and erosion.

Date: 2025-02-27
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:9dv4u_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/9dv4u_v1

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