Closure without Resolution in European Prison Oversight
Nasrul Ismail
No fdbma_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science
Abstract:
Compliance with judgments of the European Court of Human Rights is conventionally recorded as a terminal status: a case is open or closed, a judgment executed or pending, an obligation met or unmet. These measures enable scholarly comparison, but they cannot show how a state engages with the supervision of a judgment or whether reform of prison conditions endures. As such, this article treats compliance as conduct and asks whether the closure of supervision reflects durable improvement in the conditions a judgment addressed. Drawing on the documentary record of Committee of Ministers supervision in three pilot-judgment jurisdictions (i.e., Italy, Romania, and Hungary), with two contextual comparators (i.e., Spain and England and Wales), it codes state disclosures for opacity and stance and reconstructs responsiveness descriptively from the dated supervisory sequence. Two independent coders reached strong agreement (Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.88 for stance and 0.90 for opacity, on small, well-specified eligible data sets). The cases did not form a single compliance scale but displayed distinct configurations. Specifically, Italy was transparent but shifted in its stated position before closure in 2016; Romania combined continuing engagement with capacity explanations; and Hungary combined formal but insubstantial engagement with selective disclosure. Set against current prison occupancy, the state that had completed supervision was the most overcrowded: Italy recorded 120.7 occupants per 100 places, exceeding Hungary's 114.5 and Romania's 111.2. Because the occupancy snapshot postdated Italy's closure, it could not reveal whether closure caused the later overcrowding, but it did manifest that closure did not secure lasting improvement in reforms. The article frames this durability gap as a problem of means-ends decoupling and offers a reproducible method for distinguishing compliance conduct from the substantive conditions oversight exists to change.
Date: 2026-10-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-inv, nep-law and nep-tra
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:fdbma_v1
DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/fdbma_v1
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