 Panel Study of Russian Public Opinion and Attitudes (PROPA) Wave 4Aleksei Gilev,
Marina Vyrskaia,
Ilia Nadporozhskii and
Margarita Zavadskaya
No h6vms_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science Abstract: This fourth wave of the Panel Study of Russian Public Opinion and Attitudes (PROPA), conducted in June 2025, provides new insights into how Russians view the economy, the war in Ukraine, political institutions, propaganda, and the country’s future. Economic perceptions remain broadly stable. Most respondents report that their household income enables them to cover basic and some discretionary expenses, although inflation remains a persistent concern. Evaluations of both personal and national economic conditions have neither improved nor sharply deteriorated, yet perceptions of inflation and limited growth continue to pose risks to regime legitimacy. Attitudes toward the war show a gradual but consistent erosion of open support for the “special military operation,” falling from 52% to 48% since March 2024. Meanwhile, open opposition has grown modestly, and support for peace talks has increased. War fatigue, the spillover of drone attacks into Russian cities, and the disruption of daily life appear to be contributing factors. At the same time, many respondents remain ambivalent or unwilling to state their position, reflecting ongoing fear and censorship. Media consumption patterns highlight the effectiveness of state censorship: YouTube usage has dropped under state throttling, while reliance on Telegram for news has increased. Television remains dominant but shows signs of eroding trust. Political interest remains relatively high, though open discussion of politics has slightly declined, reflecting awareness of repression. Approval of political institutions continues to edge downward. Support for the State Duma and government has weakened, and even Vladimir Putin’s approval shows a modest but consistent decline. Although Putin retains support from more than half of respondents, the rally-around-the-flag effect has clearly waned. Institutions such as the police and courts enjoy particularly low moral authority, while the army and the Russian Orthodox Church remain relatively trusted. Expectations for the future are mixed. While most respondents continue to anticipate economic growth and see renewed mobilization as unlikely, optimism about a quick peace settlement has declined following unmet expectations of U.S.-mediated negotiations. Concerns about rising crime, linked to the reintegration of war veterans, are growing. Overall, the data suggest a society that is economically stable but politically fragile. War weariness, limited trust in institutions, and declining approval of state actors all indicate that the regime’s legitimacy depends increasingly on managing perceptions of economic stability and avoiding sharp shocks that could alter public expectations. Date: 2026-03-27 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:h6vms_v1 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in SocArXiv from Center for Open Science |
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