Disfungsi Pengawasan Badan Permusyawaratan Desa: Subordinasi Struktural, Asimetri Informasi, dan Desain Kelembagaan Alternatif

Sahroni Darmawan

No mku9b_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: The Village Consultative Council (BPD) was designed under Law 6/2014, amended by Law 3/2024, as an institutional counterweight to the village head. In practice, it operates in dysfunction due to structural subordination and fiscal dependency. Through policy analysis of Law 3/2024, GP 16/2026, and MoHA Regulations 110/2016 and 20/2018, this article identifies seven design failures, including budget dependency, recruitment vulnerabilities, weak enforcement, and information asymmetry. Comparative analysis with local councils in India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines reveals that oversight independence requires protected budgets and proactive information access. This article recommends three policy innovations via regional discretion without statutory amendment: a protected budget mechanism (10–15% of the Village Fund Allocation), a proactive right-to-receive information framework, and an institutionalized Village Social Audit Forum integrated with regional inspectorates and measured through a Village Democracy Health Index (VDHI). Keywords: village governance, BPD oversight, institutional design, social audit, Village Fund Allocation

Date: 2026-06-22
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:mku9b_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/mku9b_v1

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