Functional Relocation of Authority in Decentralization: Institutional Change and Local Government Autonomy in Punjab, Pakistan

Zia ur Rahman

No num7p_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Decentralization is expected to strengthen local democracy, yet Punjab’s local governments have operated with limited administrative and fiscal autonomy despite repeated reforms since 2001. Documentary thematic analysis, structured around a mechanism-based framework, traces institutional provisions in legislation, amendments, consultation reports, and audit records for 2001–2022. Authority has been repeatedly relocated across provincially controlled offices and bodies rather than transferred to elected institutions, termed functional relocation of authority. The Deputy Commissioner, a colonial-era district office within Pakistan’s elite civil service cadres, exemplifies this: its coordinating role was relocated to the Chief Officer under the 2013 reform before being reintroduced by name in 2019, showing that the underlying function, not any single office, persists. Four pathways operationalize it: administrative authority concentration, fiscal oversight, functional displacement, and institutional reversibility. These mechanisms reproduce institutional dependency and constrain elected local governments’ autonomy, offering a structural account of persistent local-government ineffectiveness in Punjab’s decentralization framework.

Date: 2026-10-30
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://osf.io/download/6adf86ff32a0a1b1a7d02221/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:num7p_v1

DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/num7p_v1

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SocArXiv from Center for Open Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by OSF ().