Religious Cycles of Government Responsiveness: Why Governments Distribute in Ramadan

Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed
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Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed: Toulouse School of Economics

No pfv89_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: This paper studies why governments in Muslim autocracies expand distributive policies and service delivery during Ramadan. Focusing on Egypt from 2014 to 2020, it argues that autocratic regimes distribute during Ramadan to contain political threats emerging from reputational pressure and mobilization risks. Using municipal-level data on government-reported economic benefits, it finds greater reported distribution in Ramadan, especially in places where threats are higher.

Date: 2026-06-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:pfv89_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/pfv89_v1

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