The Geometry of Power: Path Integrals in the Dynamics of Political Regimes

Caesar Edward

No t9pur_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: This paper, "The Geometry of Power," presents a path-integral framework for analyzing the dynamics of political regimes under uncertainty. Whereas the earlier work, The Calculus of Power, focused on optimal paths, the present approach replaces single optimal paths with ensembles of permissible political histories, each weighted by an action functional. In this paper, we also introduce the concepts of path entropy, state entropy, and free action to describe the structures of political accessibility and strength. We then used Monte Carlo simulations, calibrated with political, economic, and conflict indicators, to test the validity of the framework on six East African countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The aim of the analysis is to evaluate the relative accessibility of democratic, authoritarian, military, and collapsed regime endpoints. The results show that the stability of regimes and shifts is governed not only by minimizing costs but also by the “entropy of the geometry” that shapes rational political behavior under uncertainty. Authoritarian regimes are found to be structurally strong under prevailing regional constraints. However, democratic transitions are restricted to narrow and fragile pathways.

Date: 2026-01-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://osf.io/download/695bb48f25ae28804a8a6d09/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:t9pur_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/t9pur_v1

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SocArXiv from Center for Open Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by OSF ().