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Whose land do they die for?

Haejun Moon
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Haejun Moon: Biotech

No tdjpn_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: National defense is a paradigmatic public good. Yet defense exhibits a structural asymmetry between the (universal) distribution of its costs and the (concentrated) distribution of its benefits. This paper introduces the concept of a security premium to show that the value realized by national defense accrues exclusively to landowners while its cost is borne by all citizens. I derive the normative foundation of the land value tax (LVT) from the principle of proportionality rather than from efficiency. This principle is grounded primarily in contractarian rationality, with Aristotelian distributive justice and the libertarian tradition (especially Nozick's principles of justice in holdings and left-libertarianism) playing supporting roles. This derivation is independent of the ontological argument of Georgism and the efficiency argument of the Henry George Theorem (HGT). I then formalize the structural asymmetry through two models. The basic model introduces a probability of conquest p and shows that the difference in net gain between groups is vᵢp + (δᵢ − δⱼ), demonstrating that the asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits is independent of pre-existing wealth and arises from the value realized by defense. The intergenerational extension, which incorporates the life-risk premium of conscription, exhibits a double asymmetry in which young, landless conscripts bear the highest costs while receiving the smallest benefits. The parameter p shows that countries facing a higher threat of conquest experience a larger security premium and asymmetry. The historical patterns and consequences of this double asymmetry are then verified through three cases: the Roman latifundia, post-WWI Britain, and Korea's land reform. Extending beyond defense, I show that the cost-benefit asymmetry also exists in social overhead capital and other public goods, and argue that the LVT should serve as a major source of revenue for public-goods expenditure. The paper concludes by drawing out the implications of this analytical framework for contemporary inequality research.

Date: 2026-05-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:tdjpn_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/tdjpn_v1

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