Making Federalism Work (for Democracy)

Philip Rocco and Paul Nolette

No u7qa2_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Can American federalism serve as a check on central authoritarianism? As formal structures go, federalism’s effectiveness as an institutional constraint on central authoritarianism appears limited. Yet, as we argue in this article, the federal structure provides creative political actors with a repository of legal, fiscal, and organizational resources to contest authoritarian rule. Realizing this potential, however, will require rebuilding subnational civic infrastructures. Moreover, it will require state and local officials to employ their existing authority in new ways to expose the material consequences of authoritarian actions, increase the costs of these actions, and reduce the costs of dissent and resistance. We conclude that realizing federalism’s democratic potential depends on political choices rather than structural guarantees.

Date: 2026-07-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:u7qa2_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/u7qa2_v1

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