Corruption and Firms

Emanuele Colonnelli and Mounu Prem

No v3s8w_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: We estimate the causal real economic effects of a randomized anti-corruption crackdown on local governments in Brazil using rich micro-data on corruption and firms. After anti-corruption audits, municipalities experience an increase in the number of firms concentrated in sectors most dependent on government relationships. Through the estimation of geographic spillovers and additional tests, we show that audits operate via both a direct detection effect as well as through indirect deterrence channels. Politically connected firms suffer after the audits. Our estimates indicate the anti-corruption program generates significant local multipliers which are consistent with the presence of a large corruption tax on government-dependent firms.

Date: 2020-12-30
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Related works:
Journal Article: Corruption and Firms (2022)
Working Paper: Corruption and Firms (2020)
Working Paper: Corruption and firms (2019)
Working Paper: Corruption and Firms (2019)
Working Paper: Corruption and Firms (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:v3s8w_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/v3s8w_v1

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