Preregistration as Cheap Talk: The Logic and Limits of Self-Enforcing Plans in Scientific Research

Zion Little, Jacob Montgomery and Keith Schnakenberg

No v7cgj_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Preregistration has become increasingly prominent across scientific disciplines, with proponents claiming it reduces selective reporting and improves research credibility. Yet its logic is puzzling. Researchers face no formal penalty for straying from their stated plans; indeed, deviations are explicitly condoned. Why should simply announcing a plan change behavior? We address this question by modeling preregistration as a form of cheap talk in a model of private experimentation --- a costless, non-binding announcement that nonetheless shapes reviewer expectations and creates informal discipline through rational belief updating. We show that preregistration can be self-enforcing without any third-party oversight since deviations from an announced plan signal that undisclosed tests failed, and reviewers discount results accordingly. Scientists in our model thus voluntarily choose constraining plans since they lower the evidentiary bar for publication. But the very logic that explains the success of preregistration for enhancing researcher credibility makes its downstream consequences ambiguous. The plans scientists optimally choose retain substantial flexibility for selective reporting while still preserving the credibility benefits of preregistration. The result is that preregistration --- when researchers control plan design --- can produce higher false positive rates than an unrestrictive plan. We discuss how better institutional designs --- such as encouraging disclosure of all preregistered results, and ensuring plans are specific enough that such a norm is meaningful --- would more reliably achieve preregistration's intended goals.

Date: 2026-10-20
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:v7cgj_v1

DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/v7cgj_v1

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