Decomposing Recruitment Elasticity in Job Matching

Ryo Kambayashi (), Kohei Kawaguchi and Suguru Otani

No wavdn_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: This study estimates and decomposes recruitment elasticity, a key measure of employer market power, across job-matching stages using data from Japan's largest job-matching intermediary. On average, recruitment elasticity is negative but not statistically significantly different from zero. However, this masks heterogeneity across stages. The negative elasticity arises from lower-wage workers avoiding higher-wage vacancies during inquiry. Posted wages positively influence application, interview attendance, and offer acceptance decisions, with elasticity decreasing in that order. Other important patterns are also examined.

Date: 2024-12-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://osf.io/download/674fc086439b3db588d071f7/

Related works:
Working Paper: Decomposing Recruitment Elasticity in Job Matching (2025)
Working Paper: Decomposing Recruitment Elasticity in Job Matching (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:wavdn_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/wavdn_v1

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SocArXiv from Center for Open Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by OSF ().