Eliciting normative expectations with coordination games allowing for neutral report

Francesco Bogliacino, Diego Aycinena and Erik Kimbrough
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Diego Aycinena: Universidad del Rosario

No y3fha, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: We measure normative expectations in dictator games and naturally occurring vignettes using the norm-elicitation procedure based on coordination games (Krupka & Weber, 2013). We test a five-item scale, allowing subjects to report "neither socially appropriate nor inappropriate" behavior. In principle, this category is better suited to identify heterogeneity in normative expectations or asymmetries around the most appropriate action (as in the dictator game) but provides an oddity that may constitute a focal point, biasing the report. We find no evidence of distortions but also limited evidence of changes in the shape of the distribution. The use of the neutral category is robust to the inclusion of an incentive-compatible "I don't know" response, confirming that the category is correctly interpreted by subjects. The elicitation method using the coordination game appears robust to the risk of false positives (detecting norms where they do not apply) and the risk of a competing focal point. Based on our results, scholars who intend to recover norms in settings with asymmetries and normative and non-normative actions may use the neutral category, but if these issues are not a concern, should stick with the standard scale.

Date: 2024-04-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:y3fha

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/y3fha

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