Does sanctioning disabled claimants of unemployment insurance increase labour market inactivity? An analysis of 346 British local authorities between 2009 and 2014
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Aaron Reeves: London School of Economics and Political Science
No ztgdq, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science
Imposing financial penalties on claimants of unemployment insurance may incentivise labour market re-entry. However, sanctions may have differential effects depending on the work-readiness of the claimants. Here, I explore whether sanctioning disabled claimants is associated with greater labour market activity or inactivity among disabled people using data on 346 British local authorities between 2009 and 2014. When the number of sanctioned disabled claimants rises (as a proportion of all claimants) the proportion of economically inactive people who are also disabled becomes larger. There is not a clear relationship between sanctioning disabled claimants the proportion of employed people who are disabled.
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