One Policy, Many Publics: Central Bank Communication and the National Politics of Trust

Björn Bremer and Lucio Baccaro
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Björn Bremer: Central European University

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Abstract: Central bank decisions have become politically contested. In response, central banks communicate more with the public, since their effectiveness rests on public trust. Yet whether they reach ordinary citizens is largely unknown. We exploit the European Central Bank’s unexpected announcement of the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) during the fieldwork of a March 2020 survey in Germany and Italy. Our results show that the same decisive intervention was rewarded only where it aligned with the perceived national interest: in Italy, trust in the ECB rose, strongest among news-followers and the left; in Germany, trust in the ECB did not move at all, even as trust in national institutions surged. Preferences for central bank goal independence moved in neither country. Citizens thus notice exceptional monetary policy decisions, but their responses are mediated by national interests and discourses, with asymmetric consequences for a central bank that makes one policy for many publics.

Date: 2026-08-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:zyvjh_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/zyvjh_v1

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