Strategy-proof Sharing

Hideki Mizukami, Tatsuyoshi Saijo () and Takuma Wakayama

No 05-05, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: We consider the problem of sharing a divisible good, where agents prefer more to less. First, we prove that a sharing rule satisfies strategy proofness if and only if it has the quasi-constancy property: no one changes her own share by changing her announcements. Next, by constructing a system of linear equations in a manner that is consistent with quasi-constancy, we provide a way to find every strategy-proof sharing rule. Finally, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of non-constant, strategy-proof sharing rules, by examining the relationship between the constancy of strategy-proof sharing rules and the dimension of the solution space of the linear system.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Bossiness; Non-constancy; Quasi-constancy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/0505.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy-Proof Sharing (2003)
Working Paper: Strategy-proof Sharing (2003)
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