Innovation, Licensing, and Imitation: The Effects of Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Industrial Policy
Koichi Futagami (),
Tatsuro Iwaisako () and
Hitoshi Tanaka ()
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Hitoshi Tanaka: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
No 07-05, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics
This paper examines the long-run effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and industrial policies on innovation and technology transfer using a North-South quality ladder model where licensing is the main mode of technology transfer to developing countries. We show that the governments of developing countries can promote innovation and technology transfer by strengthening IPR protection, which is enforced by restricting the imitation of products. Moreover, the results also imply that subsidies on the cost of license negotiation can promote innovation and technology transfer, whereas subsidies on the cost of R&D have no effect.
Keywords: Licensing; Imitation; Innovation; Intellectual property rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F43 O33 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-tid
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:0705
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