A Dynamic Model of Conflict and Cooperation

Wolfgang Eggert, Jun-ichi Itaya () and Kazuo Mino

No 08-27, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: We introduce a common-pool contest into a continuous-time, differential game setting to model the dynamic behavior of agents facing a trade-off between socially productive activities and appropriation. We are able to identify multiple Markov perfect equilibrium strategies that are nonlinear in a state space, thus leading the economy to a state where epartial cooperation f occurs. We show that such cooperation can be seen as a response to conflict. We also discuss the consequences of changes in the effectiveness of appropriation, the number of contenders, and the rate of time preferences on contest equilibria.

Keywords: Conflict; Cooperation; Differential Game; Markov Perfect Equilibrium; Nonlinear Markov strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2008-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/0827.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:0827

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The Economic Society of Osaka University ().