 Exit and Voice in a Marriage MarketAkiko Maruyama, Takashi Shimizu and Kazuhiro Yamamoto No 09-04, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics Abstract: In this paper, we present a model in which agents choose voice, exit, or stay options when their marital condition becomes bad. The "voice" option can be interpreted as a spouse's effort or "investment" in the household to resolve his/her dissatisfaction and improve the marital condition. If a spouse hopes to divorce, he/she chooses "exit" option. If a spouse does not hopes to express his/her opinion and to divorce, he/she chooses "stay" option. We focus on the role of "exit" and "voice" in a marriage and investigate the effects of divorce law which is based on fault or no-fault on divorce rates. Our paper shows that divorce rates tend to be too higher under unilateral divorce law in the non-transferable utility case. On the other hand, mutual-consent divorce law generates multiple equilibria and then divorce rates are inefficient even in the transferable utility case. In this multiple equilibria case, divorce rates are determined by social factors as culture, norm, and religion, etc. Keywords: Exit; Voice; Divorce law (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:0904 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC. |
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