Efficiency of skill training for acquiring sector-specific skills with search frictions

Keisuke Kawata

No 11-21, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops a simple search model in which sector-specific trainings are endogenously determined with or without a negotiation between a worker and an employer, and characterizes the allocation of two types of training. If a worker and an employer can negotiate over the amount of skill training, the training hours to acquire a skill specific to this employer's sector may be longer or shorter in the decentralized allocation than in the socially efficient allocation. Meanwhile, if they cannot negotiate, the training hours are definitely longer in the decentralized allocation than in the socially efficient allocation.

Keywords: Excess entry; sector-specific skills, job search, wage bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-hrm and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:1121

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