General Equilibrium Model for an Asymmetric Information Economy without Delivery Upper Bounds

Ken Urai (), Akihiko Yoshimachi and Kohei Shiozawa ()
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Ken Urai: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
Akihiko Yoshimachi: Doshisha University
Kohei Shiozawa: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

No 13-27-Rev.2, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce production into the standard general equilibrium model with asym- metric information, which was proposed by Dubey et al. (Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 2000; Econometrica 2005). In such an economy, there is no rational explanation for producers' de- livery upper bounds while the endowments naturally limit consumers' deliveries. However, we show that the typical equilibrium allocation of the asymmetric information economy necessarily and sub- stantially depends on such exogenous upper bounds (Example 1 and Theorem 1). In other words, an equilibrium existence theorem without such upper bounds, even if such exists, will typically fail to treat the asymmetric information problem, e.g., the adverse selection problem. Hence, to treat the equilibrium existence problem under the informational asymmetry appropriately, we have to extend the standard model so that the delivery upper bounds need not to be speci ed explicitly. For this purpose, we propose a quite natural and realistic assumption with respect to the techno- logical condition related to the market delivery, i.e., the existence of some small standardization, commoditization, and/or transaction costs of market deliveries is shown to be sufficient (Theorem 3).

Keywords: general equilibrium model; asymmetric information; adverse selection; market viability problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2013-10, Revised 2017-03
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