Education, Social Mobility, and Talent Mismatch

Yuki Uchida

No 15-21, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This study presents a two-class, overlapping-generation model featuring social mobility inhibited by the mismatch of talents. Mobility decreases as the private education gap between the two classes widens, whereas it increases with an increased public education spending. Within this framework, we consider the redistributive politics of public education and show that the private education gap provides the government with an incentive to increase public education. We also show that social mobility reveals a cyclical motion across generations when the political power of the poor is weak.

Keywords: Social mobility; Public education; Redistribution; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 I24 J62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dge and nep-edu
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:1521

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