Political Economy of Taxation, Debt Ceilings, and Growth
Tetsuo Ono () and
Yuki Uchida ()
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Yuki Uchida: Faculty of Economics, Seikei University
No 18-22, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics
This study presents an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capital accumulation and considers probabilistic voting over capital and labor taxes and public debt to finance public education expenditure. Our analysis shows that the greater political power of the old induces the government to raise the labor tax on the young and lower the capital tax on the old as well as issue debt. The analysis also shows that the introduction of a debt ceiling rule calls for a rise in the labor tax and thus lowers the welfare of the currently working generation. However, it increases the growth rate, and this growth effect raises the welfare of future generations. These benefits last for a long period even if the rule is imposed only for a limited time.
Keywords: Capital taxation; Public debt; Economic growth; Probabilistic vot- ing; Overlapping-generations model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 E24 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-gro, nep-mac, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:1822
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