On the Role of Job Assignment in a Comparison of Education Systems
Katsuya Takii and
Ryuichi Tanaka
No 09E005, OSIPP Discussion Paper from Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
Abstract:
This paper reexamines how differences in systems for financing education influence GDP by highlighting a neglected function of education policy: it affects the magnitude of gains from job assignment. When more productive jobs demand more skill, privately financed education can increase productivity gains from matching between jobs and skill by increasing the availability of highly educated people. This differs from the standard argument that publicly financed education increases the total amount of human capital by equalizing educational opportunities. It is shown that if job opportunities have large variations in productivity, education policy may face a serious efficiency--equity trade-off.
Keywords: Job assignment; Human capital; Education system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D72 H42 I22 O11 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-hrm and nep-lab
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Related works:
Journal Article: On the role of job assignment in a comparison of education systems (2013) 
Journal Article: On the role of job assignment in a comparison of education systems (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osp:wpaper:09e005
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