An implementation of constrained efficient allocations in hidden information economies

Yuya Wakabayashi
Additional contact information
Yuya Wakabayashi: JSPS Research Fellow (DC2), Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

No 24E002, OSIPP Discussion Paper from Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

Abstract: We examine a simple hidden information economy with a single agent, multiple identical firms, and two goods. The agent’s states are unknown to the firms. The game unfolds in two stages: in the first stage, firms offer a menu of allocations, and in the second stage, the agent selects her preferred allocation from the offered allocations. We show that, in almost all cases, the constrained efficient allocation cannot be implemented by a subgame perfect equilibrium in the game.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Constrained efficiency; Nash implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11pages
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2024/DP2024E002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osp:wpaper:24e002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in OSIPP Discussion Paper from Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Akiko Murashita ().