Complete Loss of Competition:Uncontested Elections and Political Rents

Naruki Notsu, Asahi Semma and Shuko Harada
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Naruki Notsu: Osaka School of International Public Policy, The University of Osaka
Asahi Semma: Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting Co., Ltd.
Shuko Harada: Osaka School of International Public Policy, The University of Osaka

No 25E004DPRev., OSIPP Discussion Paper from Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

Abstract: This study examines how the complete absence of electoral competition shapes politicians' behavior in a democracy. To explore this, we focus on uncontested elections, which are common in democracies worldwide yet are understudied. We develop a dynamic model with belief updating in which politicians elected unopposed lower their perceived risk of future challenges and raise their optimal salary. We test these predictions using the context of Japan’s uncontested elections, which operate within a common institutional framework. We find that mayors who win office without a contest subsequently increase their salaries. The salary response is largest after the first uncontested win and smaller thereafter, consistent with learning and belief convergence in the model. These findings suggest that when visible public conflict—such as the presence of other candidates—is absent, politicians are more likely to seek personal gain, highlighting the fundamental role of elections in disciplining officeholders.

Keywords: Uncontested elections; Politicians’ behavior; Political rent; No competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35pages
Date: 2025-09, Revised 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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