Fiscal Reconstruction Policy and Free Riding Behavior of Interest Groups

Toshihiro Ihori and Jun-ichi Itaya ()

ビジネス創造センターディスカッション・ペーパー (Discussion papers of the Center for Business Creation) from Otaru University of Commerce

Abstract: This paper investigates dynamic properties of fiscal reconstruction process by analyzing the infinite duration dynamic game among various interest groups with a framework of voluntary acceptance of tax burden. By comparing the first best solution, the open-loop solution under enforceable commitments, and the feedback solution without commitment, we explore the free riding behavior of interest groups during fiscal reconstruction process and investigate the normative role of taxes and transfers to internalize the free riding problem.

Keywords: fiscal reconstruction; free riding; consumption taxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1998-08
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Published in Discussion paper series (1998), 49: 1-34

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ota:busdis:10252/4240

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