Inertia and Herding in Humanitarian Aid Decisions

David Fielding

No 1009, Working Papers from University of Otago, Department of Economics

Abstract: Using panel data for the period 1995-2008, we model the aid allocation decisions of the three largest official donors of humanitarian aid: the United States government, the United Kingdom government and the European Commission. We find evidence that donor decisions depend on both the recipientÕs need and the donorÕs economic interest, but with marked asymmetries in the relative importance of different factors across the three donors. Moreover, some donors exhibit much more inertia than others in responding to new areas of need, and some are much more influenced by the decisions of other donors. Despite being a relatively small donor, the United Kingdom is particularly influential.

Keywords: Humanitarian aid; Dynamic panel model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H59 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2010-08, Revised 2010-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.otago.ac.nz/economics/research/otago077136.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:otg:wpaper:1009

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