Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information
Mariya Halushka ()
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Mariya Halushka: Department of Economics, University of Ottawa
No 2104E, Working Papers from University of Ottawa, Department of Economics
I consider settings with rich private information â€“ an agent's type may include private information other than just his preferences. In such settings, I identify a necessary condition for obviously strategy-proof implementation of social choice rules. I consider applications to strict preferences, matching and object allocation.
Keywords: Obvious strategy-proofness; Mechanism design. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ott:wpaper:2104e
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