Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource

R. Quentin Grafton, D. Squires and Kevin Fox

Working Papers from University of Ottawa, Department of Economics

Abstract: The British Columbia halibut fishery provides a natural experiment of the effects of "privatizing the commons". Using firm-level data from the fishery two years before private harvesting rights were introduced, the year they were implemented and three years afterwards, a stochastic frontier is estimated to test for changes in technical, allocative and economic efficiency. Despite some improvements in short-run measures of cost efficiency, overall the fishing fleet still remains well below the best practice frontier.

Keywords: PROPERTY RIGHTS; EFFICIENCY; FISHERY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L5 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ott:wpaper:9804e

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