Land Deals in Africa: Pioneers and speculators
Paul Collier and
Anthony Venables ()
No 69, OxCarre Working Papers from Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford
Much African land currently has low productivity and has attracted investors leasing land as a speculative option on higher future prices or productivity. To be beneficial land deals need to induce productivity enhancing investments. Some of these will be publicly provided (infrastructure, agronomic knowledge), and some can only be provided by ‘pioneer’ investors who discover what works and create demonstration effects. Such pioneers can be rewarded for the positive externalities they create by being granted options on large areas of land. However, pioneers must be separated from speculators by screening and by requirements to work a fraction of the land.
Keywords: land deals; farmland; Africa; rent; lease (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 O55 Q1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-dev
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Journal Article: Land Deals in Africa: Pioneers and Speculators (2012)
Working Paper: Land deals in Africa: pioneers and speculators (2011)
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