Tax Competition Leading to Strict Environmental Policy
Cees Withagen and
No 76, OxCarre Working Papers from Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford
We study tax competition when pollution matters. Most notably we present a dynamic setting, where the supply of capital is endogenous. It is shown that tax competition may involve stricter environmental policy than the cooperative outcome.
Keywords: environmental policy; race to the bottom; pollution taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 O11 Q33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-pbe and nep-res
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Journal Article: Tax competition leading to strict environmental policy (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:oxcrwp:076
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